SELF INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE
Another principle is available in the situation where Congress constitutionally regulates business enterprise; namely, that designated records of the regulated activity do not come within the privilege against self-incrimination. 12 This does not mean, however, that the government has complete freedom of access to those records. At this point, the corollary problem of illegal search and seizure must be met. 13 Generally, access is secured either by permission or through use of the administrative subpoena power which is a common provision in modern statutes.
14 Such subpoenas are judicially enforceable, but the judiciary may restrict the scope of the subpoena issued by the administrative agency. But his subpoena power is subject to those judicial restraints already indicated.
20 Of course, if the party consents to a perusal of -his records, the illegal search and seizure objections may be avoided.
21
Assuming consent or the issuance of a judicially enforceable subpoena, the holding of the Amato case that the privilege against selfincrimination does not apply as to quasi-public records, i.e. those required to be kept by law, is a logical one. 22 Certainly, there was never any doubt as to public records which were the property of the state. 23 The same problem was early encountered under the Inter- ,itate Commerce Act, and the Supreme Court said that records of transactions which were subject to the regulation of Congress could not be refused on self-incrimination grounds. 24 When the law is constitutional, therefore, the reasoning excluding the privilege is that the duty to keep the records rises anterior to the crime; and the citizen is on notice that at some future time, a report must be made. 25 Practically speaking it is difficult to see how a law could be effectively administered and violations of it punished if the rule were to be otherwise.
26
If the second grounds for the holding in the Anato case be correct; namely, that an action for treble damages is remedial rather than penal, it is immaterial whether the rcords upon which the recovery was based were private or quasi-public. This follows under the Fifth Amendment as facts involving a civil liability are not within the privilege.
2 7 Here the action was thought to be remedial because its primary purpose was ". . . to protect the public and effectuate a public policy sought to be accomplished by the Act." 2 8
Thus phrased the test as to the nature of the action ignores the sanction of treble damages and looks essentially to the intent of Congress. Congressional reports suggest that this provision was viewed as a policing aid in that it would deter initial violations of the Act and mitigate the enforcement duties of the government.
" 9 The history of the double damages section of the Fair Labor Standards Act was before the Congress together with the knowledge that actions thereunder had been held to be civil rather than criminal.
30 Similarly, such actions under the Sherman and Clayton Anti-Trust Acts are civil rather than criminal. 31 The size or seeming severity of the recovery is no conclusive clue if, indeed, a clue at all. In Marcus v. Hess, 3 2 for example, a sizable recovery was had in a qui tam proceeding after the respondent had been indicted and fined for defrauding the government. It was held, however, that the forfeiture and double damages provision of the defrauding statute involved did not constitute a criminal action placing the respondent in double jeopardy. Although a restitutional element was present in that the government got part of the recovery, the Court indicated that Con-
